PROTECTING PEOPLE AGAINST RADIATION EXPOSURE IN THE  AFTERMATH OF A 
RADIOLOGICAL ATTACK PREFACE


 After the events of 11 September 2001 there has been increasing worldwide
 public apprehension about the use of radioactive materials that could be  employed in a
 malevolent act. Those events generated heightened levels of awareness regarding
 security of installations, facilities and apparatuses holding radioactive  materials.
 Members of the public, the media and political representatives have become
 particularly concerned about the possibility of sources and devices containing
 radioactive materials being turned into a malevolent tool,for instance by  dispersing
 their radioactive content into the community and threatening the public health  and
 welfare of inhabitants. There is also concern about the possibility of sabotage  attacks
 on nuclear facilities, where the malevolent aim might be to trigger uncontrolled
 releases of radioactive materials. The potential diversion of nuclear weapon  material
 and its use in improvised nuclear devices has also been considered feasible.
 
 These speculations on the possibility of what has been termed a ‘radiological
 attack’ have triggered a widespread request for professional advice, not only on
 radiation and nuclear security measures aimed at preventing successful attacks
 occurring, but also on radiological protection measures to be undertaken should  such
 an event actually take place. In particular, it has been recognized that  existing
 radiological emergency contingency plans have mainly focused on unintended
 accident scenarios, which sometimes can be forecasted in advance, rather than on
 malevolent, deliberate and ingenious attacks designed to maximize harm or  anxiety
 and fear.
 

 
 

In response to the need for advice, the International Commission on
Radiological Protection (ICRP), hereinafter referred to as the Commission, at its
regular meeting in June 2003 established a Task Group to prepare a report providing
advice for protecting people against radiation exposure in the aftermath of a
radiological attack. In preparing the report, the main aim of the Commission has been
to collect relevant available recommendations on radiological protection that might be
applicable in the aftermath of one of these malevolent events, and provide guidance
on additional measures that may be necessary to prepare for and to respond to them.

The Task Group did not specifically address consequences resulting from
unintended loss of security, i.e. from inadvertently relinquishing the necessary control
of radiation sources. Moreover, it considered, but did not assess, the potential or the
likelihood of possible threat scenarios of a radiological attack. The Task Group
assumed that a breach of the required security, leading to a radiological attack, could
actually occur and, based on that presumption, it developed advice on how to
intervene with actions aimed to protect public health, for both responders and
members of the public, in accordance with the Commission’s recommendations.

It is neither the Commission’s role nor the intention of this report to provide a
universal prescription for solving the difficult issues that authorities may face in the
context of a radiological attack. The recommendations in the report are generic in
nature and may require modification in the light of prevailing social and political
circumstances, as well as availability of resources, at the place where and the time
when such an event might occur. The report assumes that countries have allocated a
priori responsibilities for the management of the potential radiological emergency
resulting from an attack and its recommendations builds upon the existing concepts
and processes for emergency preparedness and response to radiological emergencies
that have been developed over many years. It is stressed that all contingency planning
to provide for emergencies of this genre must contain elements of flexibility, as the
nature and types of emergencies will vary greatly both in scale and in the type of
response required.

The membership of the Task Group was as follows:
• Roger Clarke,
• Roger Cox,
• Abel J. González (Chairman),
• Lars-Erik Holm,
• Fred Mettler,
• Christian Streffer, and
• Annie Sugier.
Craig Conklin, Donald Cool, Malcolm Crick, and John Wheatley, who processed the
many revisions of the Task Group report, were corresponding members.

For the preparation of the report, the Task Group met in the headquarters of the
Swedish Radiation Protection Authority, in Stockholm, Sweden, 10 to 12 October
2003, and of the International Atomic Energy Agency in Vienna, 20-22 April 2004.
The Commission wishes to express its appreciation for the support received from
those who hosted those meetings. The Task Group report was adopted by the
Commission at its meeting in Vienna, in 23-25 April 2004 for presentation at the
ICRP web-site for consultation.
 

 
 

L'intero draft è scaricabile da: http://www.icrp.org/draft_protect.asp